A Regional Mess?!
The Swedish state structure can be described as an hourglass. According to PETERSSON (2000:84) a comprehensive summary shows that public power in Sweden is relatively centralised and concentrated. Sweden can rightly be described as both a centralised country (bearing in mind the strong central government) and as a decentralised country (with the important role within the welfare state played by municipalities). However the county administration 1 still remains ambiguous -so much so that the term regional mess is sometimes used to describe it. At the regional administrative level in Sweden there are many actors such as the County Council, the County Administration Board, municipal association, and central state agencies.
There are currently 40 different central state actors present at the regional level and currently Sweden has 38 different regional 'maps' (OLAUZON 2006) . This has left the regional administrative level with unclear jurisdictional borders, different ad hoc institutions (for example, different kinds of municipal associations depending on area The term regional mess thus refers to the complex co-operation between actors and political levels (local/municipal, regional, and national), or as Bengt Owe Birgersson (who headed up the Commission of Inquiry with the task to analyse the regional organisation of public services in the early 1990s) defined it: 'it occurs when too many responsible authorities and too many agencies, administration and political bodies co-operate in far too many policy issues within far too changeable geographical areas where the borders rarely coincide and sometimes clash' (REGIONUTREDNINGEN 1992:63) . Hence the regional mess originate from the meeting of two interrelated problems: partly it is about the relationship between the different political levels, where the regional level exists in interplay between the local, national and supranational levels, and partly it is about the multitude of different actors, both public and private (for further discussion on this see BENZ et al 2000) .
Moreover, it is in this dividing line (between levels and actors) where BADERSTEN (2002:33) argues that the complex co-operation has arisen. What also makes the regional level blurred is that the relative clarity with regards to who is responsible for what and their respective roles, which can be found at both national (central) and local (municipal) levels, is still lacking at the regional level. Or as LINDSTRÖM (2005:63) incisively puts it, Sweden has very little of what elsewhere in Europe would fall under the term 'region' (i.e. a clear regional executive that can be found in, for example, German Länder or the Scottish Parliament). Thus the (in)famous complex problem Sweden experiences regarding regional co-ordination is not only about improving cooperation between different policy measures, but also creating a more united view on what really motivates a future development of the role of the regions in politics However, the historical heritage of Sweden's regional mess needs to be explored further in order to set the current mess into context. Sweden -and especially the Swedish central administration -has after decades of investigations/inquiries and political discussion still not been able to decide which role the regional level and regions should have within the Swedish administrative structure. The result of this has been a constant tottering between different suggestions of reforms, marginal displacements with regards to who should be responsible and constantly changing constellations of co-operation between actors and interest groups at the regional level (LINDSTRÖM 2005:64) .
LINDSTRÖM (ibid) argues that a probable cause of the central governments decision angst over what to do with the regional level is
Sweden's historical heritage from the Middle Ages and the establishment of Sweden as a united territorial state. This is because the Swedish unitary state developed through a gradual elimination of the then regional level (landskap -provinces). A systematic centralisation over the new territory took place where a newly instituted regional level -county (län) -was established. Sweden today has more or less the same county division that was introduced in 1634. This was followed by a transformation, at the local level, of the then parishes into municipalities 2 , into an authority that did not have the potential to challenge the central state in its supreme wielding of power in the same way as provinces, which were both larger and more historically rooted. It is through this development that Sweden's divided political power structure consisting of municipalities and the central state has dominated the territorial politics until today. -high level of welfare provision through general taxation;
-high rates of tax for both individual and businesses;
-an active labour market policy with a commitment to full employment as a means of providing these taxes;
-uniform standards across the country based on the principles of equity and fairness; and -an important role for local authorities in the delivery of these services.
It is this last feature that illustrates the hourglass characteristic of the Swedish statea strong central state setting the standards across the country, as well as coordinates the redistribution between local authorities, and the strong local level in the delivery of these services. Thus, LOUGHLIN et al (2005:365) argues that at the core of the current debate about the role of who should provide the services of the welfare state can be seen as a tension between those, who are mainly found in favour of local authorities and thus advocates further decentralisation of local autonomy (and to some extend diversity in services provided), and those who are in favour of (re)centralisation of services in certain areas and regulations relating to services 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The tendencies of privatisation and kommundelsnämnder fall under the heading of endogenous factors, whereas, internationalisation/globalisation, the shift of some decision-making from national level to supra-national level and the partial emphasis on regionalism of the EU can be classed as exogenous pressures for change. These pressures for change can also be seen if one examines changes at the regional level throughout EUrope during the 1980s and 1990s. LOUGHLIN (2001:21) argues that these changes may be the result of gradual and increasing pressures for change to various -both internal and external -challenges, or the changes may be the result of reform programmes (e.g. French decentralisation in the 1980s or the current devolution process in the UK). He also argues that some of the challenges are (LOUGHLIN 2001:24-25) . KEATING (1998:17) argues that the EU has modified the state-region [sub-national authorities] relationship, this because the traffic between regional interests and the EU has not been one-way. The European Commission itself has played an important role in mobilising regional interests, There are both top-down and bottom-up regionalisation processes; the top-down process is usually seen as a state-led process and can have more political aims such as to pre-empt and to contain bottom-up regionalism (when the pressure for change comes from sub-national levels) (JOHN 2001:111) . There are certain functions, JOHN (2001:111) , which create a need for a regional level, for example transport and regional economic development because local government cannot effectively perform this task. JOHN (2001:114-117) has also set out factors that influence both processes of regionalisation.
" Table 1 about here"
When examining various regionalisation processes one has to take into consideration that regionalisation can be perceived as a central state policy where the state consciously constructs regional centres of power -thus a state-led top-down process.
Regionalism (the bottom-up process), on the other hand, can be viewed as a phenomenon from inside where regional actors ideologically construct their territory and create various forms of regional networks. However, regionalisation without regionalism can be expected to lead to regional technocracy and regionalism without regionalisation can be expected to lead to political tensions between the centre and the periphery (GIDLUND 1999:5-6 ). This leads us neatly to the current regionalisation process in Sweden, which one can argue started with the introduction of the Regional Pilot Project in 1997.
The Regional Pilot Project
In terms of political administrative powers the Regional Pilot Project can be viewed as a small revolution. The Regional Pilot Project regions were granted new competencies in issue-areas that were formerly the prerogative of the County Administrative Board. The pilot regions assumed responsibility for regional development and long-term planning, including tourism, the allocation of EU funding, and regional transport infrastructure. In addition to being answerable for drafting the strategies for the county's long-term development, the new political body in each pilot region also had/has the main responsibility for acting as the region's representative in (Sweden only has two levels -national and local. The difference between local authorities and county councils is the population size needed for the task with which they are assigned to carry out) Thus, one could view these two regions as up-graded county councils. There has been (and still is) resistance within the central administration in viewing Skåne and Västra Götaland as regions; however this is not the view in the two regions. The opinion in the two regions is further backed by the the criteria set out in law. This matter because, it only takes one municipality within a county to block the creation or the folding of a Regional Development Council.
Explaining the Regional Pilot Project
As this article seeks to ascertain the extent to which the recent regionalisation processes in Sweden have made a difference to both the regional mess and the 'hourglass structure' of the state one needs to explore the origins of the Regional Pilot Project. One can here discern both endogenous and exogenous (in this case 'EU'ropean) arguments by actors in favour of regionalisation, and how these arguments have been intertwined by the actors within the process, for example, one argument used is that 'with globalisation it becomes even more important what we do Did Swedish EU membership play a part in helping the regionalisation process insofar as it created new, unanswerable pressures for reform? Or was it just used as a convenient argument for empowering the regional level? I argue that EU membership was partly the cause -one of many -that strengthened the regionalisation process.
There are three main reasons for this:
-EU membership provided models of and pressures for more professional working methods for dealing with issues at regional level;
-The partnership principle within EU structural funds; and -EU membership put renewed focus on the regional level. vehicle to push the regional agenda forward by sub-national actors arguing that they should take over responsibility for regional economic growth and development, and to provide a locus of accountability. The sub-national levels in Sweden then took the opportunity provided by EU membership to put pressure on the national level for change. There has been, one could argue, an informal network of actors promoting the idea of regional government.
" Table 2 about here"
In the context of this network it is impossible to distinguish if there was particular support/resistance for the regionalisation process at national level or in one particular political party. Instead, it appears that the persons within the network shifted around, moving from being civil servants, interest organisation employees, and/or politicians.
Moreover, these people often held office at different levels of government in the relevant period. The regional actors' desire to take more responsibility over the region's economic growth and development coincided with the financial crisis that Sweden went through in the early 1990s. In the then difficult financial climate, regionalisation became an (1985) for a discussion on transfer of 'crisis' management to a lower level, the regional in this case). It was also part of a more general attempt to try new structures for Sweden's unprecedented economic problems. It was at this moment in time that the changes in regional administration and in Swedish regional policy become reenforcing of each other. After the financial crisis traditional regional policy in Sweden was no longer possible and in the spring of 1998 the Swedish parliament approved the bill Regional Growth -for Employment and Welfare. This bill contained a proposal for a regional industrial policy and the overall objective of the policy was to utilise the unique features of each region. To succeed in this endeavour, industrial policy will have to be adapted to regional and local conditions, thereby putting the region in the spotlight. There was a realisation that within today's Sweden all three levels (central, regional, and local) are needed within the administrative/service structure of the state. For example, some municipalities are too small as people commute over the municipality-borders for employment and/or education and thus there was a realisation that co-operation between municipalities was needed within further policy areas. To be able to solve welfare problems today one can argue that the national level is too big -it cannot solve the problems Sweden face on its own any more (interview with CEO Regional Council Kalmar County June 2003), for example the change of regional policy into regional industrial policy. There has also been a realisation that the local level is too small for some services within the welfare state, for example public transport policy; in addition, maintaining social equality in the face of economic recession was considered to require structural change (interview The bill introduced Regional Growth Programmes (modelled on the workings of the programme idea of the structural funds) and especially, it introduced the regional partnership principle into Swedish regional policy. Thus the argument here is that EU membership provided a new toolbox to work with within regional policy as a result of the practical experience gained by actors at regional level that has come through EU membership and the operations of the structural funds. The reason for briefly bringing in changes in regional policy to the debate about these to regional administration is that they are, unintentionally, a twinned process. In retrospection one can see the importance that the process of regionalisation and the process of decentralising In the case of changes in the regional administration structure, then, Europeanisation 13 (i.e. 'EU'ropean pressures for change) does not play any direct role in the regionalisation process in Sweden. Instead of EU membership being the cause of the reforms to regional governance structures in Sweden it was rather used as an argument to justify them. However, what comes to light in the Swedish case is that in future research into regionalisation where one believe that the EU is the cause for (OLSSON 2003) . By strengthening the region's internal ability for action and to secure these policies and actions in legitimate institutions, i.e. elected bodies, the actors within the regionalisation process aimed to resolve the regional mess (PARK 2000:151) .
One result of the establishment of Regional Assemblies in Skåne and Västra
Götaland, and the Regional Development Councils is that in Sweden there is now a broader base when discussing the regional level. What has this meant for the regional mess?
" Table 3 " Table 4 about here"
There is thus something of a tug of war between the central and the local level (leaving the regional level to be pulled from two directions), but no fundamental change in the power structure. However, in order to illustrate the situation more fully, in relation to terminology there has been a change -today the use of the word region implies that it is believed that the region will increase further in importance within the state structure (interview with Deputy Director, Minister of Finance June 2003).
However, how this will occur is another matter and one has to await the Committee on Public Services Responsibilities findings that is expected to be published in February of 2007 to be able fully to answer this question. Although there is today a conscious usage of the term region there has not been, so far, any transference of real financial powers to the region/regional elected actor 14 with regard to regional growth agreements, as it is the central government that has the final say on how much of the budget will be spent within the regions through regional policy.
In addition to the change in terminology there has been a change in thinking on the government side, that the region is needed for the economic growth of Sweden. One could have believed that the power structure in Sweden would start to change with the introduction of the regional pilot projects in 1997. However with the re-centralisation (with the Catch 22 mechanism) introduced with the creation of the Regional Development Councils one could argue that the central state is re-claiming the powers given in 1997 to the Regional Pilot Regions. This can be argued despite the fact that the Regions of Skåne and Västra Götaland still exist and they have kept the powers that were transferred to them in 1997. Moreover, even though these two regions have taken over, from the old county council, the right to levy taxes, their main expenditure Thus, to sum up, one can draw the conclusion that even though Sweden introduced a regional pilot project in 1997 with regions that had extended powers transferred to them from the County Administration Board, the subsequent re-centralisation of these powers (by stopping the regional pilot project for two of the regions, Kalmar County and the Island of Gotland, and also by introducing the regional development councils) allowed the central government to re-appropriate powers that had been decentralised. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Perhaps an answer to the design question of the hour-glass/vase, or at least partial answer, will be provided when the Committee of Public Sector Responsibilities have presented their findings. What we can expect is a tidying up of the current regional mess -how tidy this cleaning session will be one has, also, has to wait and see. It is with great interest we await the report from the Committee of Public Sector
Thus the regional level in Sweden is
Responsibilities, although we can expect to see recommendations Sweden will have fewer regions and that these new regions are modelled upon the current regional pilot regions -Skåne and Västra Götaland. One could from this draw the conclusion that as EU membership highlighted the need for a Swedish regional 'executive' this has influenced somewhat the new regions, thus one could argue that they are the result of a successful strategic 'EU'ropeanisation by the regional actors promoting regional governance.
1 The terminology county and region will be used interchangeably throughout the article reflecting practice in Sweden, thus region and regional level refers to the meso level of administration in a threetier system. 5 These alternatives were:
The central state at regional level, i.e. the County Administration Board, should have responsibility for regional development issues. A more co-ordinated county administration, which should be expanded to more areas relevant to regional growth, should be established, and the County Administration Board's role as a uniting regional agency should be strengthened.
Municipalities, in co-operation with each other, should take over the responsibility for the regional development issues. The county council's tasks would be transferred to the municipalities, and later the county councils would be abolished. The County Administration
Board should in principle still have the same tasks, but possibly some tasks could be transferred from the County Administration Board to an agency which would be formed by the municipalities in co-operation.
To create a new elected regional agency/assembly, which would then take over responsibilities from both the county council and the County Administration Board. The county council was to be abolished while the County Administration Board was to be transformed into the central state supervisory agency at regional level. 8 European regionalisation -new regionalism -is concerned with the shift in decision-making from national level to sub-national levels (GREN 1999:37) and one can find the origins to this shift in EU's supranational regional policy. creates a capacity for independent action aimed at developing a specific area (sub-national but supralocal) through the mobilisation of its economic fabric and, where appropriate, of features of local and regional identity, and through the development of its potential. This process can occur on the basis of existing institutions, or can give rise to a new territorial organisation which will better fulfil these aims. 14 The Regional Assemblies of Skåne and Västra Götaland nor the Regional Development Councils. 15 Only the Centre Party has a track record at central level of advocating an elected regional institution;
it has done so since the 1960s. The Centre Party no longer promote regional self-governance as a lone voice among the political parties, and has now been joined by the Liberal Party, the Green Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. Up until the 1990s the Left Party supported central state influence over the regional level; however they have switched position and now want to increase the region's power.
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